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rights as individual rights
The role of corrective and distributive forms of 
justice in determining “appropriate relief”
Christopher Mbazira
Different notions of justice infl uence the remedies that courts grant in socio-economic rights litigation. The two 
theories of justice discussed here derive from the philosophies 
of corrective and distributive forms of justice.
Corrective justice demands that 
victims be put in the position 
they would have been in but 
for the violation of their rights. 
Distributive justice, on the other 
hand, is based on a recognition 
of the constraints of corrective 
justice. Unlike corrective justice, 
distributive justice focuses not 
solely on the interests of the victim, 
but on society at large.
These theor ies of  jus tice 
infl uence a host of other factors 
such as the relationship between 
rights and remedies, the form and 
procedures of litigation, and the 
manner of implementing remedies. 
They also influence the liability 
rules adopted by the courts to 
determine wrongfulness and 
whether the plaintiff has suffered 
as a result.
Defi ning corrective justice 
and distributive justice
Corrective justice
The corrective justice theory 
i s  gu ided by  the  v i s ion  o f 
libertarianism, which is based on 
the view that each person has 
the right to live his/her life in any 
way he/she chooses, so long as 
that individual respects the rights 
of others. The government exists 
only to protect people from the 
use of force by others. From this 
perspective, individual freedom 
cannot be sacrifi ced for the sake 
of the common good (Sandel, 
1998: 16; Rawls, 1999: 3). The 
primary function of the court is 
therefore the resolution of disputes 
in order to achieve fair results from 
human interaction and to maintain 
individual autonomy.
Libertarians define human 
rights in a negative manner: all 
we need are rights that guarantee 
non-interference 
f rom  o t he rs  i n 
our enterprise of 
seeking autonomy. 
In this philosophy, 
litigation is viewed 
a s  a  v e h i c l e 
to  re s to re  t h e 
autonomy of those 
whose rights have 
been violated. Thus those who 
believe in the philosophy of 
corrective justice recognise the 
fact that stopping legal wrongs 
completely is impossible. However, 
they perceive the law as a tool 
for restoring those who have 
been wronged to the position they 
would have been in but for the 
wrong. Indeed, corrective justice, 
in Aristotle’s definition, “plays a 
rectifying role in a transaction 
between man and man” (Aristotle, 
1908: V:2).
I n  modern  p r i va te  l aw , 
corrective justice is most prominent 
in tort (delict) law, but applies also 
in property and contract law. 
When parties enter into a contract, 
it is assumed that they begin as 
equals with corresponding rights 
and duties. Omission by one 
party to discharge his/her duties 
– for example, by not paying the 
price or delivering the goods 
– destabilises the equality of the 
parties. It leads to an unjustifi able 
ga in  by  one  par t y  and  a 
corresponding loss to the other 
party. The effect of such conduct 
is that it changes the position of 
both parties, unfairly advantaging 
one and disadvantaging the 
other. This is what is meant by 
“destabilisation” of the parties’ 
equality. The purpose of the law 
in this case becomes to restore 
that equality. The same equality 
could be assumed with respect 
to  de l i c t ua l  w rongs 
because of the alteration 
of the victim’s position as 
a consequence of the 
wrongdoer’s conduct. The 
victim will have to endure 
phys i ca l ,  emot iona l , 
financial or other loss 
which would not have 
occurred had the wrong 
not been committed.
It is not enough, however, to 
prove that the victim’s status has 
been altered to claim a remedy 
under the corrective justice theory; 
there must be proof that the 
alteration has resulted from the 
defendant’s wrong. Additionally, 
a judge’s discretion is limited to 
those remedies that, as much as 
possible, restore victims to their 
previous position.
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Where the 
state is the duty 
bearer, it may 
be necessary 
for the court to 
look at the wider 
obligations of the 
state and not 
just liability in the 
case at hand. 
As it focuses on the victim at 
hand, litigation based on corrective 
justice is generally not suited to 
resolving structural or systemic 
violations (violations that occur and 
endure in a sustained manner as 
part of an institution’s behaviour) 
ar is ing from organisational 
behaviour. However, this does 
not mean that it is completely 
irrelevant to redressing violations 
resulting from such behaviour. 
It may, for instance, be used to 
address discrete wrongs suffered 
by individuals at the hands of state 
officials. Where a constitutional 
violation arises from a “one-
shot” wrong and is suffered by an 
identifiable victim at the hands 
of an identifiable wrongdoer, 
corrective justice can be used to 
correct such harm.
Distributive justice
Distributive justice is concerned 
with the distribution of benefits 
and burdens among members 
of a given group. The benefits 
may accrue to such members 
either simply by virtue of their 
membership of the group or as a 
result of some entitlement.
The notion of distributive justice 
is supported by the philosophy of 
utilitarianism, which is based on 
the belief in an individual’s well-
being, and also lays emphasis on 
the common good of society and 
the well-being of all its members. 
An act is just only if it maximises the 
well-being of everyone else.
From a utilitarian perspective, 
the law and the courts have 
very important roles to play in 
the enterprise of realising social 
cooperation. According to this 
view, courts have to consider 
interests other than those of the 
parties before them.
Unlike bilateral corrective justice, 
distributive justice is multilateral 
in that it has community-wide 
implications. As a result, the 
court in a given case, far from 
limiting its remedy to addressing 
the wrong between the parties 
before it, also focuses on what 
has been described 
as collateral interests 
(Cooper-Stephenson, 
1991: 19). This arises 
from the recognition 
that not all interested 
pe rs on s  may  be 
party to a suit, yet 
their interests may 
be affected by the 
outcome of that suit.
Distributive justice 
is also based on an 
acknowledgement that it is not 
possible in all cases to put the 
victim of a wrong in the position 
he/she would have been in but 
for the violation. It is not always 
possible to identify discrete 
wrongs and the wrongdoer with 
precision. Harm may be infl icted 
on groups of people, not only 
on an individual victim, and may 
arise from conduct that cannot be 
associated, in liability terms, with 
a specifi c defendant. Where the 
state is the duty bearer, it may be 
necessary for the court to look at 
the wider obligations of the state 
and not just liability in the case at 
hand. Without asking whether or 
not the government is guilty, the 
court can, in some circumstances, 
dedicate its efforts to getting 
solutions that may do away with 
the harm.
Rather than being guided 
by strict rules of procedure and 
bound by the existing causes of 
action and remedies, distributive 
justice allows the court very wide 
discretion to fashion causes of 
action and remedies as the needs 
of justice demand. Distributive 
justice puts equity in its right place 
by treating it as a primary source 
of law. For instance, courts are 
not bound by the requirement that 
equitable remedies 
will only be available 
where common law 
remedies are proven 
to be inadequate.
Because of the 
necessity to avoid 
repetition of the same 
conduct, distributive 
justice allows remedies 
to  have  a  fu t u re 
direction and focuses 
on the needs of the 
community as a whole. This should 
be contrasted with corrective 
justice, which is backward-looking 
and focuses on the individual 
claimant in order to address past 
wrongs. It is true that the process 
of administering distributive justice 
may begin with a pronouncement 
on the legal consequences of past 
actions. Unlike corrective justice, 
however, distributive justice will use 
such past actions as a basis for 
determining future actions.
It insists on a full correction 
of the violation “absent special 
c i rc u m s ta n c e s ” .  “ S p e c i a l 
circumstances” are circumstances 
which may impact on the remedy, 
such as the costs associated with 
the implementation of the remedy.
It should be noted further 
that under distributive justice, 
the court focuses not only on 
the nature of the injury but also 
on the distinctive character of 
the parties in the court case. It 
also focuses on the character of 
6ESR Review vol 9 no 1
include entitlements that can 
only be enjoyed by a group. 
This is especially true of the 
positive elements of these rights 
which compel the government 
to take measures to realise them. 
Obligations of this nature require 
the government to provide goods 
and services for the benefi t of all 
members of society or groups of 
people.
It is especially in respect of 
socio-economic rights that the 
transformative nature of the 
Cons t i t u t i on  has 
been underscored. 
The  Cons t i t u t ion 
i s  pe rce i ved  a s , 
among other things, 
an ins t rument  to 
t ran s fo rm  Sou t h 
Africa’s society from 
one based on socio-
economic deprivation 
to one based on an 
equal distribution of 
resources (Klare, 1998: 
147). The provision 
of services, which was racially 
skewed under the apartheid 
system, is therefore considered to 
be central to the transformative 
project of the Constitution (Langa, 
2006: 351).
 However, even when socio-
economic rights are accepted 
as justiciable, there is always the 
question of whether they should be 
enforced as conferring individual 
benefits or as conferring group 
benefi ts. In the Constitution itself, 
most socio-economic rights are 
crafted as individual rights – 
“everyone has the right to …” and 
“every child has the right to …”. 
Nonetheless, the question remains 
whether the prevailing social and 







of a society 
based on social 
justice, among 
other things.
persons who, though not parties 
to the case, would be affected by 
its results. For instance, though they 
may infl ict the same kind of harm, 
violations perpetrated by private 
individuals and those perpetrated 
by the government are generally 
of a different nature. The reasons 
leading to such violations are 
usually also quite different, and 
so are the benefi ts that may be 
obtained by the violator.
The nature of the remedies 
needed to deter the state may 
be different from those suffi cient 
to prevent private violations. For 
example, damages may be an 
effective remedy against a private 
wrongdoer but not against the 
government, which would pay 
them from public coffers.
South Africa: Distributive 
or corrective justice?
The South African courts have 
sought to focus their remedies 
beyond the individual litigant and 
to grant remedies that advance 
constitutional rights and extend 
collective or group benefi ts. Though 
vindication and compensation of 
the victim has been acknowledged 
as a fundamental objective of 
constitutional litigation, it is not 
the only objective that has to 
be achieved. The interest that 
society has in the protection of 
the rights in the Constitution and 
the protection of the values of 
an open and democratic society 
based on equality, freedom and 
human dignity is a precept that 
the courts have sought to advance. 
The courts have also considered 
the impact of proposed remedies 
on the defendant and their effect 
on the relationship between the 
defendant and the plaintiff.
To protect the constitutional 
values, the courts have, in some 
cases, awarded plaintiffs relief in 
circumstances where they might 
have not deserved it (see Police 
and Prisons Civil Rights Union and 
Others v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others 2006 (8) BCLR 
971 (E)). The Constitutional Court 
has in other cases leaned towards 
putting victims of constitutional 
violations in the position they 
would have been in had the 
violation not occurred. In the same 
cases ,  however , 
the interests of the 
c o m m u n i t y  a nd 
the interests of the 
defendant too have 
featured in what the 
court has called “a 
balancing process” 
(see, for instance, 
Hoffman v South 
Af r i can Ai rways 
2000 (11) BCLR 1211 
(CC) [Hoffman]).
T h o u g h  t h e 
South African Constitution does 
not, in express terms, prescribe 
distributive justice, it is implicit in 
its provisions. In terms of social 
justice, the Constitution is premised 
on the need to realise an orderly 
and fair redistribution of resources. 
The Constitution in this respect 
demonstrates a commitment to 
the establishment of a society 
based on social justice, among 
other things.
In addition to protecting 
individual rights, the Constitution 
guarantees a number of socio-
economic rights directly linked 
to social justice. While socio-
economic rights have elements 
that are capable of extending 
individual entitlements, they also 
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enforcement of these rights as 
conferring individual benefi ts on 
demand, in which case corrective 
justice would be applicable.
It is only after appreciating 
the historical, social, political and 
economic settings that one can 
understand the challenges of 
enforcing socio-economic rights 
as conferring individual rather 
than collective benefi ts (De Vos, 
2001: 262).
In South Africa, socio-economic 
rights assume their importance in a 
context characterised not only by 
racially institutionalised poverty but 
also by a commitment to alleviate 
or eradicate such poverty. The 
majority of South Africans live 
in extreme poverty, a legacy of 
apartheid. The available resources 
are not adequate, however, to 
facilitate the immediate provision 
of socio-economic goods and 
services to everyone on demand. 
Holistic approaches 
to providing socio-
economic goods and 
services that focus 
beyond the individual 
are the most desirable 
in the circumstances. 
One therefore has to 
rethink the traditional 
idea that remedies 
must be immediate 
and that the courts 
can order one-shot 
remedies that achieve 
correc t i ve  j u s t i ce 
(Roach, 2005: 111).
The real i sation of socio-
economic rights in contexts of 
scarce resources requires careful 
redistribution of the resources to 
benefit all in need. It is at this 
stage that the notion of distributive 
justice becomes relevant. Courts 
have to focus beyond the needs 
of the individual and consider the 
interests of society or groups of 
people. Individual rights therefore 
have to be balanced against 
collective welfare. It has been 
submitted, for instance, that it 
would have been senseless to 
extend expensive treatment to 
Mr Soobramoney “at a time when 
many poor people … had little or 
no access to any form of even 
primary health care services” (De 
Vos, 2001: 259–60, commenting 
on the case Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)). In this 
case, the Constitutional Court 
deferred to the hospital to decide 
how best to utilise scarce medical 
resources in a distributive manner 
without prioritising the needs of 
an individual at the expense of 
others.
It is on the basis of this approach 
that in Government 
of Republic of South 
Africa and Others 
v Grootboom and 
Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) 
(Grootboom), the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Court rejected the 
submission that the 
soc io -economic 
rights provisions 
in the Constitution 
conferred individual 
e n t i t l e m e n t s 
o n  d e m a nd .  I t 
rejected the submission that the 
Constitution had to be interpreted 
as establishing a minimum core 
of goods and services claimable 
individually on demand. It also 
dismissed the argument that section 
28 of the Constitution guaranteed 
an unqualifi ed right on the part 
of every child to have access to 
basic nutrition, shelter and health 
services.
Instead, the Constitutional 
Court chose to locate the claims 
of all individuals, adults and 
children, within the broader 
context of society’s needs. The 
Court held that all that the state is 
obligated to do is to put in place a 
reasonable programme to achieve 
the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights. The programme 
must be inclusive of the needs of 
all people and must address short-, 
medium- and long-term needs.
The Constitution also contains 
the underlying values of South 
Africa’s new-found democracy. 
Indeed, courts are constitutionally 
obliged to promote these values 
whenever interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. While some of the values 
may be used to promote individual 
welfare, the Constitutional Court 
has used the concept of values 
to advance the common good 
of society. Even when protecting 
individual rights, the Court has on 
some occasions used values that 
promote general welfare to justify 
such individualised protection (see 
the use of the concept of ubuntu 




A s  a rg u e d  a b o v e ,  t h e 
Constitutional Court’s use of 
the ethos of distributive justice 
is reflected in its approach to 
granting remedies for human 
rights violations. The Constitution 
gives courts very wide remedial 
powers to “grant appropriate 









to benefi t all in 
need.




victim is clearly 
identifi able, any 
subsequent 
remedy is 
likely to have 
an impact on 
other persons 
and on society 
at large.
rights” and to make “any order 
that is just and equitable” (sections 
38 and 172).
It is argued that the defi nition of 
an “appropriate, just and equitable 
remedy” depends 
on, among other 
things, the notion 
of justice favoured 
by the court. In this 
respect, the phrase 
could assume two 
meanings. It could 
refer to a remedy 
that is required by 
an individual whose 
rights have been 
violated. It could 
also mean a remedy 
that focuses on all 
interests implicated 
in the case and 
balances these interests against 
those of the individual plaintiff 
(Roach, 1994: 3–4).
The Constitutional Court has 
taken cognisance of the fact that 
when constitutional rights are 
violated, though a litigant may have 
suffered special harm, society as a 
whole is injured (Hoffman, para 43). 
If any remedies are to be obtained 
for such violation, they should be 
aimed not only at vindicating the 
victim but also at advancing the 
interests of society as a whole. 
Even where an individual victim is 
clearly identifi able, any subsequent 
remedy is likely to have an impact 
on other persons and on society 
at large.
It is on this basis that the 
Constitutional Court has adopted 
an approach that spreads the 
benefi ts of constitutional litigation 
beyond the parties in a particular 
case. This explains why, for instance, 
the Court has on some occasions 
rejected proposed out-of-court 
settlements between the parties 
where it was found that they would 
likely benefit the parties to the 
case only. In Khosa and Others 
v Minister of Social 
Development and 
Others; Mahlaule and 
Another v Minister of 
Social Development 
and Others 2004 
(6) BCLR 569 (CC) 
(Khosa), the Court 
held that an offer to 
settle a dispute could 
not be sanctioned, 
even if accepted by 
the other party, if it 
could not resolve the 
unconstitutionality 
of  the impugned 
provisions and the 
impact that they had on the 
broader group of persons who 
might qualify for a similar benefi t. 
The Court has also on occasion 
declined to award remedies even 
where a violation of a constitutional 
right has been proved, if the 
interests of justice so required (East 
Zulu Motors (Pty) v Empangeni/
Ngwelezane Transitional Local 
Council and Others 1998 (2) SA 
61 (CC)).
The Court has observed that the 
balancing process must be guided 
by the objective, fi rst, of addressing 
the wrong occasioned by the 
infringement of the constitutional 
r ight ;  second,  of  deterr ing 
violations; and third, of making an 
order that can be complied with 
(Hoffman, para 45).
In Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007(1) 
BCLR 1 (CC), the Court held 
that the principal objective of 
the law was “the restoration of 
harmonious human and social 
relationships where they have 
been ruptured by an infraction 
of community norms” (para 68). 
The Court held that instead of 
awarding damages that merely 
put a hole in the defendant’s 
pocket, the law of defamation 
should str ive to re-establ ish 
harmony between the parties. 
This is because an award of 
excessive damages would have 
implications for free expression, 
which i s  the l i feb lood of  a 
democratic society. According 
to the Court, if the plaintiff’s 
rights can be vindicated and 
res toration ach ieved us ing 
remedies less burdensome to the 
defendant, this approach should 
be adopted.
Conclusion
In the context of socio-economic 
rights litigation, one cannot use 
only the situation of the litigants 
to judge whether the remedy of 
the court is “appropriate, just 
and equitable” as is suggested by 
some authors. Instead, one should 
assess the overall impact of the 
remedy on the state’s policy or 
policies touching on the right in 
issue. One should ask, for instance, 
whether the state has overhauled 
its policy to refl ect the elements of 
a reasonable policy as defi ned by 
the Constitutional Court.
Taking the example of the 
Grootboom case, the judgment 
may not have resulted in tangible 
goods and services for the 
Grootboom community. Generally, 
however, the decision has forced 
the government to shift its housing 
programme to cater for the needs 
of people in intolerable conditions 
and those threatened wi th 
eviction (Budlender, 2004: 41). 
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The government has adopted an 
emergency housing policy to cater 
for people who may fi nd themselves 
in situations similar to that of the 
Grootboom community. Whether 
this policy is being implemented 
is another issue.
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Judicial remedies and socio-economic 
rights
A response to Christopher Mbazira
David Bilchitz
Christopher Mbazira has produced a lucid, well-researched and thorough study of judicial remedies in cases concerning socio-economic rights. This response seeks to engage 
critically with Mbazira’s claims by raising certain questions and issues stimulated by his work 
that could be developed further.
Mbazira seeks to investigate 
the normative underpinnings of 
judicial remedies and contends 
that there are two main models 
in this regard: fi rst, the model of 
corrective justice and second, 
the model of distributive justice. 
Corrective justice, he argues, 
is linked to the philosophy of 
libertarianism, while distributive 
jus t ice i s  supported by the 
philosophy of utilitarianism.
The problem with strong binary 
oppositions is that, although they can 
be theoretically illuminating, they 
